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Abstract: 
 
The literature on information economics serves the European Commission to justify the 
participation of interest groups in response to problems of asymmetric information in the 
European Union (EU) policy-making processes.  
 
Using the framework of the agency theory, the role of interest groups as information 
producers is incorporated into a model where the types of conditions in which they would 
have the incentive to cooperate in the production of information are examined.  
 
The results of the model show that the interest group’s expected utility when acting 
independently is equal to the reserve utility, while it increases when acting cooperatively. It 
can therefore be concluded that incentives for cooperation in the production of information 
among interest groups exist.  
 
One potential policy implication for the EU is that the EC could decrease the conditions of 
the contracts, thereby diminishing the costs of obtaining information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Interest groups lobby the European institutions to achieve policy decisions that are in 
line with their own preferences. While some argue that different interest groups are 
equally able to shape EU policy-making, others argue that lobbying success is 
systematically biased towards some powerful interest groups. In any case, the 
transmission of information from informed interest groups to uninformed policy 
makers is extremely important in determining policy outcomes.   
 
The process of policy-making offers several possibilities for the European 
Commission (EC) and the interest groups to exchange information. The EC contacts 
the interest representatives to invite them for a discussion of the policy-making 
where an expertise from the interest group is required. This means that the EC needs 
to cooperate with interest groups on its policy-making processes. This paper studies 
the possibility that the EC promotes a contract as an incentive for interest groups to 
behave as information producers for it to obtain information and to ensure that its 
proposals are considered in the decision-making process. The EC requires 
information about the policy positions of major stakeholders to gain an informational 
advantage over the Council and the European Parliament and to thereby ensure their 
approval. 
 
The contract is formalised by means of an agency relationship, since the EC 
possesses imperfect information with respect to the actions of interest groups, which 
must be considered in its design.  The non-observable nature of interest groups’ 
efforts in their role as information producers calls for a control system with 
appropriate incentives. In this context, conditions under which interest groups, in 
their role as information producers, find it profitable to collaborate with the EC are 
established. Simultaneously, incentives emerging from the optimal design of the 
contracts are analysed. Conditions under which the interest groups would find it 
profitable to act cooperatively rather than independently are focused on. 
 
The remainder of the study is as follows: section 2 contains a brief description of 
available literature analysing the influence of interest groups on policy-maker’s 
actions when these behave as information producers. Section 3 presents a principal-
agent model studying the incentives for cooperation given to interest groups when 
acting as information producers for the EC. Section 4 presents the main conclusions 
and future extensions. 
 
2. Interest Groups as Information Producers 
 
The participation of interest groups in policy-making is unavoidable. Literature 
studying the role and behaviour of interest groups in the political sphere has 
increased considerably over the past two decades and include a wide variety of 
models, from rent-seeking or information transmission lobbying to analysing the 
possible effects of different institutional settings or voting rules. For a more 
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comprehensive analysis, see Austen-Smith (1997), Van Winden (1999), Grossman 
and Helpman (2001) and Reuben (2002). 
 
Information supply is an important instrument through which interest groups can 
exert influence on political decisions. Information asymmetries are introduced when 
the assumption taken is that those interest groups are perfectly informed or at the 
least, more informed than the policymaker. Successful information transmission will 
depend on the position of the interest group’s ideal policy outcome relative to the 
policymaker’s. Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyse a model in the case of the 
existence of only one interest group informing the policymaker. There are several 
extensions to Crawford and Sobel’s analysis (see for example, Farrell and Rabin 
(1996), Krishna and Morgan (2001), Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and 
Battaglini (2002). 
 
It would be unrealistic to assume that in politics, transmitting information to 
policymakers is free of cost. For this reason, models in which there is a cost to 
communication have been developed, for example, Potters and Van Winden (1992), 
Austen-Smith (1995) and Lohmann (1993; 1995). 
 
Most literature concentrates on information transmission between the interest group 
and the policymaker and neglects to examine the information flow among and within 
the interest groups. Differing network structures among groups, group size, and the 
different communications channels used may have important consequences on the 
behaviour of the group and on how individuals perceive that behaviour (see 
Grossman and Helpman (2001).  
 
In the EU interest intermediation, policy information is usually held to be the critical 
resource that is exchanged among policy-makers and interest groups. The central 
aim of interest groups is political influence. Interest groups lobby decision-makers to 
achieve policy decisions that are in line with their own preferences. Lobbying plays 
a particularly important role in the European Union (Lehmann and Bosche, 2003; 
Charrad, 2005; Greenwood, 2007; Coen, 2007; Schwartzkopff, 2009; Klüver, 2011; 
Thalassinos and Dafnos, 2015). In addition, the European Commission has engaged 
in participatory engineering to use interest groups inclusion to improve the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union (Kohler-Koch and Finke, 2007; 
Bouwen, 2009; Quittkat, 2011; Klüver, 2009; 2012; Liapis et al., 2013).  
 
3. The Model 
 
It could be said that transaction costs are somehow used by the EC to justify the 
participation of interest groups in the decision-making process, but it should be 
stressed that the produced information is imperfect. Therefore, we should ask 
ourselves whether the interest groups which enjoy important advantages when 
acquiring information, should receive certain incentives from the EC. These 
incentives would be regulated with contracts and would allow for a more intense 
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integration of interest groups into the decision-making process, acting as information 
producers. 
 
We develop a theoretical model that identifies information supply and the major 
determinants of interest groups influence. It would be of advantage to interest groups 
to participate in policy making since they could augment their credibility by 
transmitting all the information at their disposal whilst simultaneously advancing 
documented opinions or preferences.  
 
Let´s assume that the preferences of the information-producing group may be 
expressed in the form of a utility function given by: 
     eK - U(w) = e)V(w,                                    (1) 
Where ( w ) represents the payment that the group receives for its collaboration with 
the EC. The payment that the interest group receives for acquiring and processing 
the information might be defined in terms of the esteem in which the EC holds the 
interest group. Thus, attaining and maintaining a healthy reputation should represent 
a natural incentive for the said group, and will condition the extent to which the 
group participates in the future. ( K ) is a positive real scalar and  U  is twice 
continuously differentiable and bounded, by   0U  and   0U . In the same 
way the inverse utility function may be written as: 
 )(U  )(
-1   
It is assumed that each interest group must exert an effort  e , which may have a 
value between 0 and 1. In short: 
 
( 1e ): Maximum effort, implying the correct evaluation of the problem.  
 ( 1e ): Indicating that the effort is below maximum, thus leading to an 
inexact evaluation of the problem.  
 
Furthermore, it is supposed that due to the non-observable nature of the effort made 
by the interest group by the EC, the EC is unable to include this effort in the contract 
offered to the group. The utility of introducing the result into the contract is derived 
from the information it provides concerning the effort exerted by the group. This 
constitutes its only value given that the EC is considered neutral with respect to the 
risk, whilst the interest group is averse to it. 
 
It will be in the EC’s interest for the contract to include any mechanism which might 
provide information regarding the behavior of the interest group taking part. The result 
of the effort can be reflected by means of a noisy indicator   . It is possible for this 
indicator to have a value of 0 or 1 and it is affected by a source of noise, when a 
maximum effort achieves the correct evaluation of a problem and therefore, results 
in reliable information. This does not mean that the estimator must equal exactly 1 
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for it to act deterministically, but rather that its value must approach 1 with a certain 
probability according to the effort made. 
 
The extent to which the Council of Ministers’ proposals are found to be acceptable, 
may be used as an indicator of the effort which the interest group exerts, on 
evaluating the problems that arise within the framework of the contractual 
relationship with the EC. Thus if ( 1 ), then the proposal has been accepted and 
this reveals the correct evaluation of the problem. Conversely, if ( 0 ), the 
proposal is then rejected which means that the evaluation of the problem was 
inexact. Furthermore, the indicator is sometimes affected by a source of noise 
because of the lack of political motivation or simple inertia affecting those 
governments that make up the Council and this factor sinks the EC’s proposals. 
 
In accordance with the given outline, the general proposal for the procedure would 
be as follows: Firstly, the EC would decide on the contract to offer the interest 
group. The interest group would then accept or reject the contract depending on its 
terms. To understand the nature of the difficulties faced by the EC prior to designing 
the contract, it should be noted that in the event of the conditions for obtaining 
information and the effort required to obtain it are asymmetric it is possible for the 
EC to propose the amount of effort it would wish the group to exert. However, it is 
not possible to reflect this effort in the terms of the contract. Therefore, the EC must 
take into consideration that the interest group can choose the level of effort once the 
contract has been signed, which is most advantageous from their point of view given 
the nature of the contract. In short, the EC may propose a certain level of effort, but 
this should correspond to the level that the interest group is willing to exert. A model 
enabling the comparison of two alternative scenarios for the interest groups has been 
set up. These differ in that they either act independently in the production of 
information or cooperate to acquire it.    
 
a) Solution of the model when interest groups act independently4 
 
Consequently, the probabilities associated with the indicator and which are 
conditioned by the effort carried out by the interest group, can be defined in the 
following way: 
q =1] <e|1=p[  
            r=1] =e|=p[ 1  
                                               q - 1 =1] <e|0=p[  
                                    r - 1 =1] =e|0=p[  
                                                          
4We extend the framework of Garcia-Lorenzo (2003) by solving the model when interest 
groups act cooperatively. 
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If the probability of the indicator being correct is greater than the probability of it 
being incorrect, then the following expression must hold true: 
 0 > q > r > 1  
Given that the effort made by the interest group benefits the EC, it is highly likely 
that a contract encouraging maximum effort will be offered  1e , achieving two 
goals; on the one hand it allows the EC to ensure that the information used in the 
elaboration of policy is reliable and thus helps to prevent the proposals from being 
discredited at the Council of Ministers, and on the other, it clears up any possible 
remaining doubts with respect to the credibility of the information-producing interest 
groups. The contract may therefore be expressed in the following way: 
 
 1 =  if ,W = )(
H   
 0 =  if ,W = )(
L   
Where (
HW ) and ( LW ) represent the payments made by the EC to the interest 
group. As previously stated, the EC will use the result as a source of information 
regarding the behaviour of the interest group. Consequently, the payment will 
depend upon the information produced whereby this payment will increase in 
accordance with the result, which in turn will result in the tendency for the interest 
group to increase the exerted effort. Finally, the letter (H) is used to indicate a high 
level of effort and the letter (L) to indicate low effort. 
 
Formally, the expression for the expected utility of the interest group as a function of 
effort may be written as follows: 
Where   HH wWU   and   LL wWU  . 
 
In order to calculate the optimum contract5, a solution to the following programme 
must be found by the EC: 
  )w(r)-(1 + )w(r  
LH
]w,w[
LH Min                                                          (4)                                                                     
 
subject to (5) and (6). 
                                                          
5 The case when the EC is neutral with respect to the risk and the interest group is 
averse to it will be studied. 
 
     K - wr)-(1 + rw = 1)=EU(e
LH          (2)                             
   eK - wq)-(1 + qw = 1)<EU(e
LH                                (3)                                                           
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  VKwrrw LH  )1(                        (5)                                                                                  
 [0,1]e   e)-K(1  )w-wq)(-(r
LH                (6) 
Where (5) ensures that an individually rational (IR) group accepts the contract 
(   VeEU 1 ) and equation (6) ensures incentive compatibility (IC) in order to 
motivate the group to select  1e . This equation reflects the fact that the interest 
group is willing to choose the option that the EC proposes  1e  if that option 
maximizes its objective function, which is    11  eEUeEU . Since the (IC) 
constraint will be most binding for  0e , it can be rewritten as: 
   Kwwqr LH  .  
After solving for first-order optimality conditions, the following results are reached: 
 
q-r
q
K - V = w
L
 
  
q-r
q
K V = w
H 

1
                                                                                   
The solution to the programme resolved by the EC to design the optimum contract 
may be defined in the following way: 
     ]
q-r
q-1
K + V[ = W
H                                            (7) 
     ]
q-r
q
K - V[ = W
L                                              (8) 
Where (W
H
) and (W
L
) represent the optimum values for the payments made by the 
EC to the interest group. 
 
The interest group’s expected utility, considering the payments made by the EC and 
equation (1), will be as follows: 
K - wr)-(1 + wr = 1)=EU(e LH  
The following is obtained when substituting  w H and  w L for its optimal values: 
 
VK
qr
qr
KVKV
qr
q
K
qr
q
rK
qr
q
rK
qr
rKK
qr
q
KV
qr
q
rKVr
qr
q
rKVreEU 


















1
)
1
)1(
From this result, the following conclusion may be drawn: The interest group’s 
expected utility, considering the payments made by the EC and equation (1), is equal 
to the reserve utility:   VewV ,  
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b) Solution of the model when interest groups act cooperatively 
 
In this scenario it is presumed that each interest group produces information and that 
the contract offered to them by the EC has identical characteristics. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the payments will be shared in equal proportions if cooperation is more 
profitable than acting independently. Considering the participation of two interest 
groups ( 1g  and 2g ), the probabilities associated with the indicator which are 
conditioned by the effort carried out by the interest groups can be defined in the 
following way: 
            
2
21 1,1 r=1] =e|=p[ gg   
                                               )(21,0;0,1 2121 r- 1 r=1] e|==p[ gggg    
                                    
2
21 )(, r - 1 =1] =e|0=0=p[ gg   
 
As previously mentioned, the EC induces each group to exert the maximum 
effort  1e . Therefore, the contract may be expressed as follows: 
  
 1 = 1 =  if ,W = )( gg
H
21 ,  
 0,0 21  =  =  if ,W = )( gg
L   
 1,0;0,1
2
2121  = =  = =  if ,
WW
W = )( gggg
LH
LH 

  
 
Where (
HW ) and ( LW ) represent the payments made by the EC to the interest 
groups. 
Considering that the interest groups are risk averse, they will accept a lower payment in 
the absence of uncertainty regarding the estimation of their effort by the EC. 
Consequently, the EC will hold higher payments when there is uncertainty in the 
estimation of the effort made by the interest group in comparison with a situation in 
which the uncertainty vanishes. Therefore, in mathematical terms the result is the 
following: 
 
w wLH             where       
2
LH ww
w

  
 
This result can be easily obtained applying Jensen’s inequality. Taking the above 
equations into account, the expected utility for each interest group of the payments 
made by the EC can be expressed in the following way: 
 
  KwrwrrwreEU LLHH  22 )1()1(2)()1(                (9) 
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And after substitute 
Hw  and Lw  for their values obtained in the first order optimality 
conditions:
 
K
qr
q
KVrwrr
qr
q
KVreEU LH 




 )()1()1(2)
1
()1( 22       (10) 
 
K
qr
q
KVrwwwrr
qr
q
KVreEU LH 




 )()1())(1(2)
1
()1( 22   (11) 
 
When considering that 
2
LH ww
w

   the expression below is obtained: 
K
qr
q
KVr
qr
q
KV
qr
q
KVrrwwrr
qr
q
KVreEU LH 















 )()1()()
1
(
2
1
)1(2))(1(2)
1
()1( 22
 
The expression obtained for the expected utility for each interest group of the EC’s 
payments is the following: 
   KrrwwKVeEU LH  )1()(2)1(                                                     (12) 
   )1()(2),( rrwwVewV LH                                                                           (13) 
 
Considering that w wLH  , the expected utility of each interest group is higher in 
the case that they act cooperatively than when they do not. 
 
4. Conclusions and future extensions 
 
This paper provides important insights for the study of the type of contracts the EC 
offers to the interest groups. The interest groups are assigned the role of information 
producers and are deemed able to solve inefficiencies stemming from the existence 
of incomplete information in the decision-making process. EC contracting with the 
interest groups the provision of this information ensures to them their good 
reputation and can also be a positive sign in their political market identification. 
Therefore, these types of relationships are beneficial for both the EC and the interest 
groups and consequently, tend to last for a long period of time. This constitutes an 
important finding since scholars have largely attempted to explain the influence of 
groups based on their characteristics and, as a result, have often arrived at 
contradictory findings.  
 
Within this context, using the framework of the agency theory, the role of interest 
groups as information producers is incorporated into a model and the types of 
conditions in which they would have the incentive to cooperate in the production of 
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information are examined. This framework could be applied to research on interest 
groups in any political context as policy issues trigger the attention of interest groups 
no matter in which political system they are introduced. Thus, to understand the 
emergence of policy outcomes, one cannot solely look at the political preferences of 
institutions, instead we must examine how their preferences come about. 
 
The results of the model show that the interest group’s expected utility when acting 
independently is equal to the reserve utility, while it increases when acting 
cooperatively.  It can therefore be concluded that incentives for cooperation in the 
production of information among interest groups exist. Finally, given that the 
expected utility of interest groups increases cooperating, the EC could decrease the 
conditions of the contract, thereby diminishing the costs of obtaining information. 
Consequently, this article contributes to our knowledge of preference formation 
within the EC.  
 
It is commonly assumed that interest groups are experts acquiring information. 
However, if it is a matter of expertise, it is not plausible that there are insufficient 
qualified experts for the government to select one with whom it shares similar 
preferences over policy. In summary, a more satisfactory explanation of the way 
information is acquired by interest groups should be put forward. In any case, our 
results show that interest groups are actively seeking to influence policy formulation 
and that they are indeed able to shape the EC proposals if they can provide 
information. Future research therefore needs to systematically consider interest 
groups pressure when trying to explain policy outcomes in the European Union. In 
the proposed model, the assumption of perfect internal monitoring eliminates the 
risk of the benefits of cooperation disappearing due to a moral hazard problem. This 
limitation allows for the possibility of new theoretical developments and the 
extension of the model, introducing either an interested or uninterested monitoring 
mechanism. Therefore, a fruitful research avenue would be to characterise the 
equilibrium under conditions of costly internal monitoring. 
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